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Russia, with total production of 581 bcm (billion of cubic meters), is the world’s leading 
producer of gas. Despite that, however, the problems currently faced by its gas industry are 
many and significant. On one hand, questions are still being asked on the capacity of 
Gazprom, the national company, to face up to the considerable financial needs to renew the 
major gas deposits developed under the Soviet days. The Russian gas company is already 
heavily indebted, while the profitability of a significant portion of its domestic market sales 
has still to be demonstrated because of very low gas prices and a significant level of non-
monetary relations. On the other hand, the progressive deregulation of the European gas 
market, its principal export market, carries stakes of a different kind for Gazprom. Its most 
likely effect will be to bring about significant changes to the future long-term gas contracts 
that form the basis for the long-term financing of investments and therefore the development 
of industrial capacity. 
 
These issues have placed once again on the agenda the oft-repeated and oft-avoided question 
of reforms in this industry. The latest project, discussed in 2002, was centred on deregulation 
that consisted in essence of ending the gas company’s monopoly on sales and production. The 
aim of this reform is to favour the development of competition on the Russian domestic 
market. This issue raises the ever-present problem of whether the deregulation reforms are 
compatible with the institutional environment in which they are being applied. According to 
the institutional literature devoted to this issue, compatibility is characterised by three separate 
criteria
2. First of all, reforms must be “attractive”, which means that they must be acceptable 
to the government and various social groups. This supposes that its redistributive effects will 
be limited. Next, they must be “feasible”. In other words, there must be no intrinsic barriers to 
their implementation and the government must be capable to enforce them. Finally, the 
institutions must ensure that the reforms are “credible”, by guaranteeing that they will not 
veer off course or come to nothing, most notably through legal or electoral intervention. The 
current debate is based on criticism of the efficiency of Gazprom’s organisational model in 
the current institutional situation, and therefore relates to the attractiveness and feasibility of 
the reform. 
 
The Gazprom’s model is the one that allows the phenomenon of non-monetary relations to be 
managed as effectively as possible. The Russian economy has benefited from stable and 
inexpensive supplies of gas, despite the insolvency of a large number of industrial and 
domestic consumers and of some distributors. In return, Gazprom has been able to obtain a 
certain number of advantages like the privileged access to hard currencies from its exports, 
which have allowed it to finance its investments to some extent. The deregulation reform 
being discussed therefore poses a fundamental question: is the development of competition 
that would be allowed by the progressive changes in the industry’s organisational structures 
compatible with the gas industry’s institutional and economic environment? The answer is not 
a simple one, but already a number of factors can be taken into consideration as being likely 
to limit its scope. It is inconceivable to introduce competition without instituting major price 
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  1reforms and a strict payment settlement regime. Turning gas-related exchanges into cash 
exchanges appears to be an essential condition for reform. At the same time, the organisation 
of inter enterprise relations into informal networks and industrial and financial groups, which 
has allowed non-payments to be effectively managed and guaranteed the survival of 
enterprises, could reduce the scope of the reforms, especially with regard to prices. 
 
The reform of Gazprom has triggered much discussion in Russia and at an international level, 
because the aim of the reform exceeds the sectorial economic interests. On one hand, its 
success depends to some extent on the level of progress made by economic reforms overall. 
On the other hand, it depends on the structure of the industrial system which has resulted of 
the mass privatisation programmes and the demonetarisation of the economy during the 
1990s. Having set out the main aspects of the planned reforms, we will now look at their 
attractiveness and feasibility. 
 
I - THE MAIN AREAS OF REFORM IN THE GAS INDUSTRY 
 
The reform of the Russian gas industry, begun in the time of Mikhail Gorbachëv and 
continued in 1991 and 1992, is the subject of a continuing debate that brings advocates of 
centralisation into confrontation with those in favour of deregulating the industry. In this area, 
the latest projects being discussed all have the same objective of introducing competition into 
the sector, but they differ somewhat on the issue of whether or not Gazprom should be de-
integrated. In recent months the gas company, which itself has long since opposed any reform 
of the gas market structures, has become more and more interested in maximising the value of 
its production and reserves. From this perspective, reform of the organisational structures is 
intrinsically linked with a major reform of gas prices on the Russian domestic market, these 
prices currently being heavily subsidised. Although it has not been addressed for some time, 
this issue is in fact the key to any major development in the industry. 
 
1.1. The actual industrial structures  
 
The structure of the Russian gas industry is dominated by Gazprom, which is a quasi-
monopoly vertically integrated in terms of production and transport. The financial holding 
company Gazprom is structured around nine main production companies set up in profit 
centres in which the holding company has a 100% shareholding, and a transportation 
company Transgaz in which the holding company also has a 100% shareholding. The gas 
monopoly is a State monopoly in the sense that the State is the dominating shareholder with 
38.4% of the shares. The rest is divided up as follows: Russian legal entities hold 33.6%, 
Russian individuals 17.7% and foreign investors 10.3%. The holding company is therefore 
privatised only to a very limited extent, and openings for foreign capital are limited. For 
international investors, the shares in Gazprom’s capital are limited by a law that restricts their 
participation in the company to less than 20%
3. Further to that, the investors may only gain 
access to Gazprom’s capital via ADRs, or American Deposit Receipts, quoted on foreign 
markets at rates very much higher than those applied in Russian financial institutions
4. The 
market for shares in the gas company is still neither unified nor free. 
 
                                                 
3 “Russian State to Retain 35% of Gazprom, by Law”. Gas Briefing Europe, April 1999, p. 12. 
 
4 In Russie, for national investors, shares in Gazprom may only be exchanged at the Moscow Stock Exchange, 
the St Petersburg Exchange, the Siberian Stock Exchange and the Yekaterinburg Exchange. 
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by a specific co-ordination mechanism known as internal transfer prices. These are the prices 
at which the holding company Gazprom purchases the gas from the production companies via 
Transgaz. Generally set at a level lower than that of gas production costs
5, they allow the 
production companies to be kept in a deficit situation, which means that their independence is 
considerably lessened. Through this mechanism, the organisational structure of Gazprom 
keeps the financing of investments centralised. The other significant element in this method of 
organisation is the centralisation of exports through the company GazExport, held 100% by 
Gazprom. Having taken over all the gas contracts signed between the old Soviet Union and 
various European countries, Gazprom obtained an export monopoly that guaranteed it access 
to the currencies linked to these exports. 
 
In recent years a number of new producers have emerged, including Itera, created from the 
transfer of production assets previously held by Gazprom and of export contracts from the 
former CIS, and four major oil companies Lukoil, Yukos, Surgutneftegaz and Rosneft. These 
companies have as yet unexploited gas reserves, significant in places. Gazprom holds only 
70% of proved and probable Russian reserves
6. At present, most of their production consists 
of associated gas. These new producers have not lessened Gazprom’s dominance at the 
production level. In fact, because of Gazprom’s monopoly on transport, these new actors are 
compelled to sell their gas to the gas company at prices fixed by the gas company. Most of 
these prices are not greatly attractive and do not guarantee even a minimum of profitability. 
Following a request from the IMF, in July 1997 the Russian Government introduced a reform 
centred on the function of Gazprom’s transportation network as a Common Carrier, in order 
to introduce a degree of competition by establishing legal bases for non-discriminatory access 
to Gazprom’s network. However, as there was no support in the form of regulations, 
implementation of this provision has remained largely dependent on the goodwill of the gas 
company. 
 
At the gas distribution level, the networks (regional networks and low-pressure city networks) 
are outside Gazprom and as such have remained under the control of regions and 
municipalities. The distribution companies known as Gorgaz are responsible for the 
distribution network within the cities. Oblgaz companies co-ordinate the distribution of gas at 
Oblast’ level. At the higher regional level, Mezhraigaz companies are responsible for 
distributing gas to areas made up of several Oblast’s and are required to purchase the gas from 
Gazprom. In recent years, Gazprom has extended its participation in these networks by 
exchanging their debts for shares and by making direct purchases in the context of bankruptcy 
procedures. 10% of the distribution network is therefore held by Gazprom, and it is expected 
that this process will continue
7. 
 
                                                 
5 Kryukov, V., Moe, A., The new Russian corporatism? A case study of Gazprom. London: Post-Soviet Business 
Forum, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996, p. 20. 
 
6 Gazprom estimates that Russian oil companies could provide gas supplies to the tune of 150-170 bcm in the 
period 2010-2020. “Gazprom hints at transportation quota for independent gas producers”, Gas Briefing 
International, May 2002, p. 3. 
 
7 Russia Energy Survey, 2002. Paris: OCDE/AIE, 2002, p. 119. These share acquisitions are most notably carried 
out through Mezhregiongaz, a subsidiary of Gazprom, created in 1997 and responsible for managing Gazprom’s 
sales to the distribution companies. 
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regulation, the FEC or Federal Energy Commission, which has particular responsibility for 
regulating the gas industry in a natural monopoly situation. To do this, the Commission, 
created in 1992, relies on the federal law concerning natural monopolies (August 1995) and 
the decree of 28 April 1997
8. Its task is to regulate prices in the gas industry, to monitor its 
investments, and to restructure the sector. However, it does not have any real independence in 
relation to the public authorities. In order to respond to the macroeconomic aims of fighting 
against inflation or maintaining economic growth, the government has intervened on 
numerous occasions in the fixing of gas prices. As the prices are in theory defined on the basis 
of production costs, this provision should have the effect of triggering huge increases in prices 
given their current levels. In fact, however, the government has intervened on numerous 
occasions (especially in 2002) to limit price increases, despite the recommendations of the 
FEC. The independence of the Commission is therefore wholly theoretical, the capture of the 
regulator by the government being of particular importance
9. 
 
1.2. The Gazprom reform project 
 
In recent years, the drop in production (-3.6% between 1996 and 2001, see Table 1) has 
stimulated the debate on reforming the gas company. Gazprom’s monopoly has been called 
into question at both domestic market level and export level. The main criticism has come 
from certain government members and from the oil companies (Lukoil, Yukos and 
Surgutneftegaz). 
 
Table 1: Evolution of the Russian gas production from 1991 to 2001, in bcm 
 
  1991  1993  1996 1999 2000 2001 
Russia  642.9  617.6  603.0 590.7 584.2 581.4 
Gazprom  601.6  577.6  564.7 546.6 523.0 512.0 
Nadym-Pur-Taz region, including:  533.3   527.7 510.8 505.0   
Nadymgazprom  68.9  68.0  65.3 72.4 73.6   
Yamburggazodobycha  166.8  174.0  176.5 175.9 168.0   
Urengoygazprom  282.8  262.8  242.2 209.1 193.3   
Outside Siberia, including:  63.4  44.0  40.4  - -  
Orengburggazprom  48.0  34.5  28.7 24.8 24.2   
Outside  Gazprom  41.3  40.0  38.3 44.1 61.2 69,4 
Itera  - -  -  6.0 18.0   
Oil holding companies       29.5 31.0   
Sources: Gazprom, Moscow, Itera Group, Gas Matters, September 2001. 
 
•  The aims of the reform 
 
Through the channel of reform, the various actors in the gas industry are pursuing different 
targets. Having significant reserves, the Russian oil companies intend in the short term to 
develop a major gas strategy provided a number of barriers to entry are lifted, especially 
conditions for access to the Gazprom main pipeline network. Being obliged to sell to 
                                                 
8 Decree relating to “The main regulations concerning structural reform in the area of natural monopolies”. 
 
9 With regard to fixing tariffs, the FEC has been subject to two contradictory conditions since 1998. On one 
hand, prices must be fixed on the basis of costs, while on the other hand, prices must not increase too much so 
that industrial growth can be facilitated. Russian Federation: OECD Economic Studies. OCDE, Volume 2000/5, 
February, p. 132. 
 
  4Gazprom at non-competitive prices, they do not have any incentive to develop new 
production. In consequence, they are claiming free and non-discriminatory access to 
Gazprom’s network in order to have an access to the solvent domestic market and especially 
to the export market. For the oil companies, the question is above all one of access to 
international markets and the associated foreign currency profits. Given the current state of 
the Russian gas market, which is distinct for having non-monetary exchanges and very low 
internal gas prices, their intention is primarily to dedicate their production to exports. 
 
In the same way a number of “reformers”, such as the Minister for Economic Development 
and Commerce, Mr G. Greff, want also to deregulate the gas industry. However, their main 
aim is to improve the competitiveness of the Russian gas industry by creating competition 
between producers at the internal level. (These new producers will be the Russian oil 
companies or new producers of gas only). Their position is slightly qualified by the issue of 
deregulation of gas exports, which is not one of their priorities. 
 
Institutional changes in Russia’s principal export market, the European Union, are likely to 
make this competitiveness and efficiency objective top priority. Deregulation of the European 
gas market, which will lead to competition between suppliers, is also likely to bring about a 
fall in prices
10. In this context, Russia’s capacity to maintain and indeed increase its market 
share will depend upon the competitiveness of its exports in relation to those of its potential 
competitors. Even though only a little information is available on Russian production costs, 
because of the statistical secrecy practised by Gazprom, it is likely that the gas supply cost 
structure will cease to be favourable to Russia as and when the major deposits brought into 
production during the Soviet era (Urengoy, Yamburg and Medvezhe) become exhausted. 
Much effort will therefore be needed to bring about rationalisation in the Russian gas market. 
 
•  The content of the reform 
 
Comprehensive reform should include the abolition of Gazprom’s quasi-monopoly on 
production and exports by removing the barriers to entry and possibly dispersing its 
production assets, defining a third party access to pipelines and deregulating gas exports. The 
planned reforms for the Russian gas industry, drawn up in 2000 by the Ministry of Economic 
Development and Commerce, the Federal Energy Commission and the Minister for Anti-
Monopoly Policies and Enterprise Aid, all pointed in this direction. It was a question of 
splitting production from transportation, creating six producers from the existing production 
companies currently held by Gazprom, and that company would have been reduced to its sole 
function of transporter with a natural monopoly and public status. The entry of new producers 
was also to have been facilitated
11. Since then, the Ministry of Economic Development and 
                                                 
10 On the question of deregulating the European gas market and the consequences of this on Europe’s traditional 
suppliers, the reader is referred in particular to: 
- Boussena, S., “New European Gas Market : Gas Strategies of Other Present and Potential Suppliers”. The role 
of Russian and CIS Countries in Deregulated Energy Markets. The 1999 International Conference, Paris, 6-7 
December 1999, The Moscow International Energy Club, and the Centre de Géopolitique de l’Energie et des 
Matières Premières of University of Paris Dauphine. 
- Finon, D., “European Gas Markets: Nascent Competition in a Diversity of Models”. Reform Group Project and 
IEPE, University of Grenoble, Research Book, July 2002. 
 
11 The three main stages of this deregulation process were as follows. The first was to set up transparent and non-
discriminatory access to Gazprom’s network with a parallel emergency of new independent gas producers. The 
vertical integration of Gazprom would not have been affected but the investors would have had the chance to 
acquire holdings in the capital of the production companies held by Gazprom. This development would have 
subsequently allowed de-integration of Gazprom. Not until the second stage (after 2004) would a true 
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envisaged, even though the deregulation of the gas industry is still very much on the agenda. 
Therefore, the main aim of the plans discussed in late 2002 is to create the conditions needed 
for new producers to emerge. The first stage of the reform, to begin in 2003, will be the 
setting-up of a transparent and non-discriminatory transportation network for Gazprom, with 
prices regulated by the FEC, and the creation of an unregulated market alongside a regulated 
market. It is defined as the first step towards deregulation of the gas industry. Gazprom will 
retain the monopoly on exports. The second stage should cover the progressive increases in 
gas prices. In the short term, de-integration of Gazprom is no longer on the agenda, even 
though a single transport company, held 100% by Gazprom, is likely to emerge. This stage 
could be the prelude to a more comprehensive reform of Gazprom. 
 
1.3. The creation of a two-tier market, a necessary condition for new producers to enter 
 
The process of reforming industrial structures, especially the Gazprom monopoly, must be 
inextricably linked with a major reform in gas prices, otherwise major distortion will occur. 
The method of determining these prices is defined by substantial subsidies, which take two 
forms. The first consists of significantly undervaluing gas prices on the internal market and 
with substantial cross-subsidies between the industrial sector on one hand and the residential 
and agricultural sectors on the other hand; the two latter are subsidised by the former. In 2001, 
these prices were $10 per 1,000 m
3 for households and $15-16 per 1,000 m
3 for industrial 
units, compared with an average of $120 per 1,000 m
3 for exports to Western Europe
12. In 
addition, since 1997 actual gas prices have fallen noticeably, a drop that was barely 
compensated for by the 15% price increase in June 2002. The second form of subsidy, at least 
until 2000, showed in the development of non-monetary relations on a considerable scale: 
barter, non-payment, inter-enterprise credits
13. These forms of payment have brought about 
major distortions in the Gazprom’s cash flow, with a marked difference between nominal 
prices and effective prices received by the Russian gas company in the context of barter 
relations. As a result, there has been a strong incentive to attach priority to exports to 
international markets to the detriment of the internal market. This has already been noticed in 
the investment projects conducted in partnership with international companies aiming first 
and foremost at the export markets and with Russian oil companies. The draft production 
sharing agreement between TotalFinaElf and Gazprom, which relates in particular to the 
development of the Shtokman deposit, addresses this question in particular. For Total, most of 
the production would have to be geared towards exports to European markets, while Gazprom 
also intends to supply the internal market from this deposit. In a situation in which the export 
market is closed to entrants, the profitability and viability of the new production will not be 
guaranteed. There is therefore little likelihood of a competitive market emerging on this basis 
for internal supplies. 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
competition-based wholesale market developed. Finally, in the third stage (2007-2013), Gazprom’s activities 
would have been centred on exports. 
Russian Federation: OECD Economic Studies, OECD, Volume 2000/5, February, op. cit., pp. 171-173. 
 
12 Petroleum Economist, February 2002, p. 40. Butler, M., “Russian Gas for Europe”, Oxford Energy Forum, 
February 2002, pp. 3-6. 
 
13 Monetary payments in 1999 therefore accounted for just 18.5% of Gazprom’s internal sales. Veksels 
accounted for 4.9%, barter for 28.9% and compensation relations 38.2%. Russian Federation: OECD Economic 
Studies, Volume 2000/5, February, op. cit., p. 146. 
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therefore to favour the emergence of a two-tier market structure, one tier with free prices and 
the other with prices regulated by the Federal Energy Commission. The independent 
producers would be able to sell most of their production on the unregulated market (which 
could take the form of “gas stock exchanges”) and thus benefit from prices much more 
favourable than those devolved on Gazprom. These independent producers would initially be 
oil companies and gas producers, such as Itera. Gazprom would also be authorised to sell a 
very small part of its production (5% or about 26 bcm) on this market. There would therefore 
be a need to distinguish between the “new gas” produced by the new producers and sold at 
free prices, and the “old gas” originating from Gazprom’s production, sold at prices regulated 
by the FEC and intended mainly for consumer categories such as households unable to settle 
their gas bills. This kind of scheme would met the twofold objective of the reforms. On one 
hand, it is aimed at developing competition by creating strong incentives to entry by means of 
the free prices. On the other hand, it would allow the progressive introduction of profitability 
on certain sections of the Russian gas market. At the end of the day, it is anticipated that the 
allocative efficiency and competitiveness of the Russian gas industry will improve, and that a 
capacity for financing investments on the basis of internal sales will be created. 
 
II - THE UNKNOWN FACTORS IN REFORM IMPLEMENTATION 
 
The gas industry reform, in its end-2002 version, includes a number of uncertainties on the 
deregulation of exports, the possibility of actually creating a two-tier market, and the 
consumer eligibility criteria separating the two markets. The possibility of actually 
stimulating competition in a two-tier market structure is an unknown factor given the volumes 
of gas involved on the free market. The question of the rhythm and sequence in which the 
reform should be instituted is an issue that must not be ignored, otherwise major distortions 
will occur and Gazprom will be allowed to maintain a monopoly on the Russian gas market. 
From this point of view, the reformers must settle the issue of whether the deregulation of the 
internal market is compatible with keeping exports centralised in the hands of Gazprom. 
 
As we have already mentioned, reforming the organisational structures and in particular the 
gas monopoly depends on the reform of prices and the conversion of gas exchanges into cash 
exchanges. These will determine the possibility of access to a solvent market, guaranteeing 
that entries will be profitable. However, reforming prices and imposing a strict payment 
discipline is still, even though some progress has been made in this area, one of the most 
difficult economic and political issues facing Russia in terms of both feasibility and social 
acceptability. Also the structuring of inter-industrial relations very specific to Russia after ten 
years of “transition” towards the market economy could put the brakes on any large-scale 
price reforms. 
 
2.1. The attractiveness and acceptability constraint in the gas reform 
 
The issue of reforming the gas industry begs a number of questions on the extent to which it 
will be accepted by the various actors involved at different levels and to different extents. The 
Russian government may only be interested in instituting a partial reform, given its wish to 
maintain a degree of control over the sectors that it considers of strategic importance for the 
Russian economy. The gas industry is indisputably one of these. The gas company will be led 
to oppose this position if its interests and survival are threatened. Consumers may also come 
out against, if the reforms are likely to have significant redistributive effects. 
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A complete reform of the gas industry, which would involve deregulation of exports, remains 
one of the most difficult issues in that it is not acceptable to the Russian State. The draft 
presented in 2002 maintains Gazprom’s monopoly on exports, a position that appears quite 
contradictory to the wish to deregulate the Russian gas industry. In this situation, the new 
actors would still in fact be totally dependent on Gazprom for their access to the international 
energy markets. 
 
The government’s short-term macroeconomic objectives will be more important than the 
question of the coherence of long-term industrial restructuring. Because of the tax revenue 
that they provide, gas exports to the European market (131.9bcm in 2001, see Table 2) are an 
important element in the macroeconomic stability of the country and therefore, implicitly, of 
its economic growth, although this is the subject of debate
14. If the Russian oil companies are 
not obliged to only supply the internal gas market, they will without doubt feed the 
competition on the West European gas market and contribute to a fall in prices on that market. 
This would go against the interests of the Russian government in terms of tax revenue and 
balance of payments, hence the maintenance of close control of gas exports. This choice is 
consistent with the State’s willingness to resume control of the gas company, especially in 
relation to investment strategies. The arrival of A. Miller as President of Gazprom in 2001 
marked a complete change in its relations with the State. Until then, the company had been 
able to develop an independent strategy and provide proof of a significant degree of 
independence in relation to the government, especially in the payment of taxes, the definition 
of investment strategies and the sharing of gas profits. Recent years have shown that the State 
has once again taken a significant degree of control, thus expressing its willing to “re-
intervene” in key areas of the economy
15. 
                                                 
14 During 2002, in the light of the changes in international crude oil prices, a long debate was held in Russia on 
the consequences of these changes on the balance of trade, the tax situation and changes in exchange rate. The 
gas industry can learn some lessons from this, given its increasing importance in Russia’s exports. In short, there 
are two conflicting arguments. According to the traditional view, Russia’s fiscal and economic situation depends 
heavily on changes in oil prices and in exchange rates. A reduction in international oil prices will cause a 
significant downturn in the balance of trade and in Russian tax revenue, and this in turn will affect the rate of 
growth of the GNP. Conversely, some studies, especially the one commissioned at the request of the Russian 
Ministry of Economic Development and Commerce, concludes that an increase in oil prices will have a negative 
effect on Russian economic growth. This increase will lead to an improvement in exchange rate, which will be 
detrimental to Russian exports with the exception of energy. On these questions, which need to be developed 
much further, the reader is referred to: 
- Rautava, J., “The role of oil prices and the real exchange rate in Russia’s economy”, Bank of Finland, Institute 
for Economies in Transition, BOFIT, Discussion Papers, 2002, No. 3, 21 pp. 
- Pauwels, J. P., Swartenbroekx, C. “La politique pétrolière russe: entre le G8 et l’Arabie Saoudite”.- Revue de 
l’Energie, No. 537, June 2002, pp. 366-379. 
 
15 Similar developments can be observed in the oil industry, for which the Russian State had lost a sizeable 
portion of its activity resources. It wanted to make Rosneft’ into a principal actor in the oil industry. “Putin 
Pushes Rosneft into the Limelight”, PIW, 1 July 2002. 
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  1980 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
W.  Europe  22,2 62,1 65,0 69,2 74,4 74,4 74,1 78,4 88,4 90,4 90,7
• European 
Union 
22,2 57,2 59,5 64,1 68,3 67,9 67,0   76,9 79,8   
Germany  (1)  11,8 22,9 25,7 29,6 32,2 32,3 32,5 32,5 34,9 34,1 32,6
France  0,0 12,1 11,6 12,2 12,5 12,0 10,9 10,9 13,4 12,9 11,2
Italy  6,4 14,1 13,8 13,8 13,9 13,8 14,2 17,3 19,8 21,8 20,2
Austria  3,0 5,1 5,3 5,1 6,1 6,1 5,6 5,7 5,4 5,1 4,9
Finland  1,0 3,0 3,1 3,4 3,6 3,7 3,6 4,2 4,2 4,3 4,6
•  Turkey  0,0 4,5 5,1 4,7 5,7 5,7 6,7 6,6 8,8  10,2  11,1
•  Switzerland  0,0 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,3
E. Europe  29,4 37,1 35,9 36,7 42,9 49,1 42,7 42,1 38,4    40,3
Czech  Rep       8,4 9,4 8,4 8,6 7,8 7,5 7,5
Slovakia       7,4 7,2 7,1 7,1 7,5  7,9  7,9
Czechoslovakia  8,3  12,8  13,2  13,8 - - - - - - - 
Poland  5,3 6,7 5,8 6,2 7,3 7,2 6,8 6,9 6,1 6,8 7,5
Hungary  3,9 4,8 5,7 5,2 6,3 7,7 6,5 7,3 7,4 6,5 8,0
Total  51,6  99,2 100,9 105,9 117,3 123,5 116,8 120,5 126,8 129,1 131,0
Sources: Cedigaz.- Natural Gas in the World, Rueil-Malmaison, various years. 
 
 
* The acceptability of the reform to Gazprom 
 
Although Gazprom’s interests are in direct conflict with any form of deregulation plan, the 
two-tier market principle is acceptable to the gas company as it is able to “accompany” the 
introduction of competition under its own conditions. The key point, given the present 
situation and assuming that gas prices will remain low for the compulsory sales of its products 
on the regulated market, remains the financing of the investments necessary for the renewal of 
its production and transportation capacities. With regard to transport, the gas company could 
suggest participation by new producers in the required investment in the gas pipeline network 
as a condition for acceptance of any new developments
16. With regard to production, as has 
already been mentioned, Gazprom is planning to form partnerships (especially in the form of 
joint ventures) with future producers for developing reserves. The Rosneft-Gazprom, Lukoil-
Gazprom and Surgutneftegaz-Gazprom agreements, which relate to the development of 
certain gas and oil deposits, are the bases for this type of strategy
17. The scope of the reform 
will have to be reduced to the extent at which the strategy will allow the gas company to 
maintain a level of control over its potential competitors’ production and therefore limit the 
effects of competition. 
 
In addition, the process of defining a two-tier market structure is likely to encourage Gazprom 
to limit its production as it will be dedicated to the regulated market, and to favour production 
by independent producers more or less under its control in order to benefit from a more 
favourable valuation for the gas on the deregulated section of the internal market. This 
strategy is all the more credible as Gazprom will maintain control of the transportation 
                                                 
16 “After the Clear-Out, Gazprom Gropes Towards a Strategy”. Gas Matters, March 2002, pp. 24-29. 
 
17 This relates mainly to deposits of oil and gas located in the autonomous province of Yamalo-Nenets, the Kara 
Sea (Vyngayakhinskoye and Yetypurovskoye deposits) and in the Caspian Sea. These agreements undoubtedly 
testify to the approval of Gazprom’s entry into oil production and conversely to the entry of Rosneft, Lukoil and 
Surgutneftegaz into gas production. 
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This explains why the reforms are acceptable to Gazprom. 
 
It must be remembered in every case that in the short term, the free market relates only to the 
50,000 bcm that the oil companies and Itera are likely to produce and the 26 bcm that 
Gazprom will be authorised to sell on that market. These figures are very insignificant 
compared to the 512 bcm produced by the gas company. Competition will be limited at the 
outset, but will exist and could therefore have a destabilising effect. 
 
* Consumers and the social acceptability of gas reform 
 
The political and social acceptability of the price reform remains a major uncertainty in the 
overall reform of the Russian gas industry. A complete price reform would have a major 
redistributive effect, and as such is likely to encounter strong political opposition. It is also 
believed that the energy subsidies allocated in the form of low prices and non-payments 
valued on the basis of OECD market prices would represent about 30% of Russia’s GDP
18. 
Only a few consumer categories would be able to bear a major increase in prices. The creation 
of the two-tier market structure is aimed partly at resolving this problem, with households 
being supplied with Gazprom gas to be sold to the distributors at a price below the market 
price. 
 
However, in the logic of a reform aimed at bringing prices and costs closer together, one 
should expect significant increases in the prices administered on the regulated market, 
together with respect for the payments discipline. It must be remembered that there is a 
marked degree of “path dependency” in Russia, indicated by planned economy practices 
based on a perception of energy as a good almost completely free of charge
19. However, the 
severe budgetary constraints on households must be added to this equation. Any increase in 
prices carries a risk of an increase in non-payments, and there is therefore a need to find a 
happy medium between real prices and prices that will trigger non-payment situations. It is 
significant that for the years 2000 and 2001, the stronger payment discipline that has been 
observed was accompanied by substantial falls in real gas prices, and that conversely, the 
increase in gas prices in early 2002 led, in the first half of the year, to an increase in the 
consumers’ debts to Gazprom of about 1,600 million roubles (that is, $50.8 million)
20. 
 
2.2. The feasibility of the deregulation reform 
 
Questions also need to be asked on the feasibility of the gas industry reform, with regard to 
the specific role played and still being played by energy in the Russian economy. From this 
point of view, the question of deregulation of gas prices runs up against restrictions, intrinsic 
                                                 
18 This figure is obtained by valuing Russian energy sales using OECD zone market prices. Using Russian 
internal prices, a figure of about 5% of the GNP is obtained, 2% of this being for the gas sector.. Russian 
Federation: OECD Economic Studies. OECD, Volume 2000/5, February, op. cit., pp. 142-144. 
 
19 This “way of dependency” partly explains the current behaviour, especially the absence of important energy 
consumption decreases following changes in the Russian economic environment. Energy intensity therefore 
tends to increase during the transition, when a trend in the opposite direction has been expected. 
 
20 For the first six months of 2002, Russian consumers’ debts to the gas industry were estimated at 40,500 
million roubles, representing one third of Gazprom’s annual investments. “Gazprom Again Looks West for 
Funds”, The Moscow Times, 26 July 2002, p. 5. 
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industrial and financial groups and into informal networks leads one to question whether it is 
possible to apply the energy price reform, and therefore whether it is possible to reform the 
organisational structures of the gas industry. 
 
* The barriers between the two markets 
 
The approach involving the creation of a two-tiered market structure is a necessary step 
towards the complete deregulation of gas prices. However, one must not under-estimate the 
tensions to which the coherence of the system will be subject. The most pronounced effects 
will be noted in defining the criteria for assessing the eligibility of consumers for the free 
market and for the exemptions. This is an issue of crucial importance in the industrial sector. 
For the enterprises, access to a less expensive supply is a question of utmost importance. In 
the institutionalised Russian context, marked by a high level of capture, the eligibility criteria 
will without doubt form the subject of bargaining agreements the outcome of which will 
depend on the power of negotiation with the appropriate minister and with the gas company. 
They could therefore lead to significant discrimination between enterprises. The question of 
competitiveness and increased exports for certain industries on the international markets will 
greatly influence the process of defining these criteria. Under the same logic of “low 
credibility of institutions”, siphoning of regulated (old) gas to the deregulated market will be 
difficult to control and have the effect of weakening the system. 
 
The difficulties connected with contractual opportunism on the part of some industrial clients 
are already being felt in the form of non-payments by enterprises that are able to pay. Not all 
of these non-payments are linked to actual financial troubles, but are the outworking of 
strategic decisions, the enterprises with the available cash having the power to use it for 
purposes other than paying their energy bills
21. This type of behaviour and practice is 
persistent and indicates a failure to perceive energy as an economic good with a cost. There is 
now a need to allocate a real economic value to energy resources and to avoid reducing the 
supply of energy to its physical availability alone. However, we are looking here at major 
changes in behaviour, behaviour that ten years of “transition” has not altered. 
 
The eligibility of producers in the electricity sector will also be a question of first importance, 
as gas represents about 73% of supplies of combustibles to power stations. The requirement to 
make supplies on the free market at increased prices could in fact seriously upset the solvency 
levels of the Energos, (the regional electricity companies). In this area, however, the situation 
already differs sharply from one region to another, as do the Energos’ financial situations and 
the links that some power stations have already managed to cultivate with Gazprom through 
direct supply agreements or partial integration mechanisms through exchanges of debts
22. 
 
* Price reform and types of Russian organisation  
 
The feasibility of price reform poses a question with regard to the organisational forms 
produced by the non-monetary relations of the 1990s. These organisational forms, which 
                                                 
21 Zlotowski, Y., La crise des paiements en Russie, expression d’un consensus social ? Les études du CERI, No. 
43, August 1998, p. 43. 
 
22 Opitz, P., “Russia: can liberalisation deliver in the post-Soviet economy ?”, Power Economics, June 2000, pp. 
18-20. 
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23, are based on specific 
institutional arrangements based most notably on complex barter relations and debt 
compensation mechanisms, especially the exchange of shares in return for debts. 
 
Gazprom’s vertical integration structure forms part of an industrial and financial group or 
IFG, via a number of shareholdings in industries that have nothing to do with its basic 
activity. In this way, Gazprom has a heavy presence in the petrochemical industry, in machine 
tools and in metallurgy (where is about to acquire a position of worldwide significance
24), but 
also in media and in the banking sector. The leading enterprises in these groups supply the 
inputs (in this case, supplies of energy) and the resources to their subsidiaries so that these 
may continue to invest and produce
25. Such “networks” are organised around profitable firms 
that take control of non-profitable firms by exchanging debts for shares
26. They rely on a very 
strong regional ingredient: in Gazprom’s case, such bilateral agreements have been negotiated 
between the gas company and the regions in relation to supplies of gas to the authorities and 
the firms as a mean of the payment of taxes and the acquisition of shareholdings in local 
distribution networks and in certain firms
27. Gazprom has also integrated itself into informal 
networks built around complex barter relations, which in this organisational logic could lead it 




At stake in this kind of institutional arrangement is most often the survival of unprofitable 
enterprises, and therefore the protection of employment. Whether it be through the group 
model or through an industrial network structure, a number of major firms, including 
Gazprom, ensure in part that some unprofitable firms will survive by allowing them to 
continue production without becoming bankrupt. In this sense, non-payment has been an 
essential factor in maintaining employment despite the collapse of the Russian economy and 
the restrictive monetary policy followed by the government
29. 
 
                                                 
23 Jordan, A., Industrial Networks and Post-Socialist Institutional Transition: Preliminary Version, RECEP, 
January 2002, 16 pp. 
 
24 C. Durand has thus shown that in 1999, Gazprom took control of three of the main Russian mining kombinats, 
most notably the Lebedinsk GOK and Mihailovsk GOK, and acquired a major shareholding in the Oskolsk 
Electrometallurgical Kombinat. He concludes that if this development continues, the gas industry giant will be 
coupled with a metallurgical business of worldwide importance. Durand, C., “La transformation de la branche 
des métaux en Russie (1991-1999)". CEMI, June 2000, 88 pp. Presented at the GTD study day, 12 January 2001. 
 
25 For a more detailed description of these relations in the gas industry, especially between the production 
companies and the Gazprom financial holding company, see Locatelli, C., Energie et Transition en Russie : les 
nouveaux acteurs. L’Harmattan, Collection Pays de l’Est, 1998, pp. 87-91. 
 
26 A. Jordan, 2002, op, cit., p. 16. 
 
27 According to an OECD study, in 2001 Gazprom signed agreements of this kind with 69 of the 89 republics 
that make up Russia. Russian Federation: OECD Economic Studies. OECD, Volume 2000/5, February, op. cit., 
p. 139. 
 
28 Using this system, Gazprom is reconstructing a system of supplies managed without the use of money. 
Kuznetsov, P., Gorobets, G., Fominykh, A., “Le troc et les impayés : témoins de nouvelles formes d’organisation 
en Russie”. Mimeo, 26 July 2000. 
 
29 Brana, S., Maurel, M., “Démonétisation en Russie : Un arbitrage favorable au maintien de l’emploi”. Revue 
Economique, Volume 52, No. 4, July 2001, pp. 841-859. 
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begs questions on the feasibility of price reform. Surely such a reform runs the risk of being 
limited by the structuring of certain firms into industrial and financial groups and into 
networks. Who will guarantee that Gazprom will not maintain preferential prices for its non-
gas subsidiaries, allowing them to become competitive in certain sectors? The result of this 
could be a serious distortion in competition in relation to firms which obtain their supplies, or 
have to obtain them, on the free market.  
 
This situation takes us back to the question of feasibility of gas price reform in a market that 
is not yet unified. The informal networks are “exchange circuits” that are isolated from each 
other and distinct for having a strong spatial ingredient as well as prices heavily differentiated 
within them. There is an implicit price system applied in the barter exchanges alongside the 
official prices. Also, different implicit prices are applied for the same good, depending on the 
bargaining power of each actor involved in the exchange. Faced with a reform in prices, these 
inter-industrial relations are likely to be maintained, when the aim of the reform is the 
creation of a unified gas market. 
 
The setting-up of the two-tier market and the reform of regulated prices (price increase) is 
therefore likely to run up against the inability of some enterprises to pay their energy bills and 
against implicit organisational forms and the institutional arrangements that arise from these 
forms. The increase in budgetary constraint, combined with steep price rises, creates the risk 
of a number of major enterprises becoming insolvent. Are the State and the Regions ready to 
face the social cost of such developments? Are they ready to call into question the implicit 
social compromise that has developed in the transition in relation to maintaining employers in 
enterprises, most notably in return for non-payment of energy bills, low energy prices, non-
payment of taxes and sometimes considerable delays in the payment of salaries?
30 
 
Defining the two-tier market system is without doubt an essential step. It forms part of a 
gradual process of definition of price reforms, aimed at ensuring that the reforms are feasible. 
It is, however, beset with a number of intrinsic difficulties. 
 
III - CONCLUSION 
 
Reforming the gas industry is currently one of the major challenges facing the Russian energy 
industry in order to pursue its development. The terms of the debate have scarcely changed 
with the passing of ten years: what level of deregulation is required, or can be introduced, in 
the gas industry? Should exports be deregulated? In the light of the restrictions on the 
financing of investments, a consensus is gradually coming together on the need to introduce 
more competition and flexibility. This choice will be inextricably linked with a major reform 
in prices; but the reform must be designed so that it takes account of macroeconomic reality 
and the position occupied by non-monetary relations, otherwise it will fail. It is evident from 
the foregoing analysis that the following elements should be taken into consideration. 
 
The attractiveness of the reforms to Gazprom. This will be an essential prerequisite for its 
feasibility. In this matter, it is undoubtedly with regard to the question of price reforms that 
the interests of the oil companies wishing to enter the gas industry combine with the interests 
of Gazprom, whose profitability is becoming more and more conditioned by massive price 
                                                 
30 Locatelli, C., Les modèles d’organisation postcommunistes: le cas de l’énergie. HDR, Université Pierre 
Mendes France, Grenoble II, May 2001, 92 pp. 
  13increases. Gazprom could therefore easily bear a reform that it would deal with in part, the 
main consequence of that reform for Gazprom being added value for its products. 
 
The attractiveness of the reforms to the Government. Although the Russian Government is 
interested in developing trading relations in the gas sector, the attractiveness of a reform 
aimed at total deregulation of the gas industry must, from the Government’s point of view, be 
questionable. Gas exports are an important aspect of Russia’s financial stability. At a time 
when the State’s capacity for controlling the oil industry is becoming more and more limited, 
the State could be encouraged to delay an in-depth reform of the gas industry in favour of 
short-term macroeconomic objectives. It is therefore likely to keep gas exports centralised in 
the hands of Gazprom, and even reinforce the centralisation by granting it a monopoly of 
exports to Asia and keep its very strong dominant position in the Russian gas industry. 
 
The feasibility of reforms. The creation of a gas market with two levels, the prelude to the 
deregulation of prices, brings with it particularly difficult problems in relation to the 
eligibility of clients for the competition market. More broadly speaking, the major element of 
the reform is the creation of a unified gas market that will allow efficient operators to flourish. 
The current structure of the industrial system, consisting of industrial and financial groups and 
networks, tends to create isolated networks of exchange in which conditions for the exchange 
of gas are specific, different from one inter-firm network to another, and heavily influenced 
by the relations that Gazprom enjoys with the regional authorities and the businesses 
involved. The gas reforms cannot be thought out without bearing this reality in mind. In 
particular, questions need to be asked on the State’s real ability to control the informal 
relations between Gazprom and the other actors at regional level. 
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